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Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
In response to its perception of "organized crime"' as a major
threat to American society,2 Congress passed the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 (OCCA-70). 3 The purpose of OCCA-70 was to
eradicate organized crime by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process 4 and by establishing new penal prohibi-
tions with particularly severe sanctions.5 New procedural tools de-
vised to facilitate the gathering of evidence comprise seven 6 of the
1. "Organized crime" is the term used to describe the various groups of people
who have made it their business to supply illegal goods and services. The major
"service" supplied is the opportunity to gamble. Organized crime is also involved in
the importation and distribution of drugs, prostitution and loan sharking. These il-
legal businesses are apparently very profitable; the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice estimated that organized crime grosses
from seven to fifty billion dollars each year. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMm'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME:
REPORT 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME].
No one has ever authoritatively determined whether a monolithic criminal organiza-
tion, known as the Mafia and composed of a number of "families" actually exists.
Some writers argue that the "Mafia" is no more than discrete groups of people en-
gaged in similar kinds of criminal activity. D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1959); D.
CRESSEY, THE THEFT OF THE NATION (1969); C. MOLLENHOFF, STRIKE FORCE (1972); N.
MORRIS 9- G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970); G.
TYLER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA (1962); Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the
American Legal System 1, 1963 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 399; 'Voetzel, An Overview of Or-
ganized Crime: Mores versus Morality, 47 ANNALS 1 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Schelling, Economic Analysis and Organized Crime, in TASK FORCE ON
ORGANIZED CRIME 114; Schelling, What is the Business of Organized Crime?, 20 J. Pun.
L. 71 (1971); sources cited in note 4 inIra.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. The sections of the Act are codified in scattered
sections of the United States Code. See notes 6-10 infra.
4. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice identified a number of reasons why organized crime continues to grow despite
efforts to arrest and reverse its development. It noted the lack of law enforcement
resources, the lack of coordination by federal and state officials, and the lack of
public and political commitment to finding a solution to the problem of organized
crime. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 198-200 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as CHALLENGE OF CRIME]; TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note
1, at I.
The most serious legal obstacle to effective control of organized crime is the diffi-
culty of obtaining evidence. See CHALLENGE OF CRIME, at 196, 198-200; SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL Acr OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; Hearings on
Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 112-13, 176-78,
499-502 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings on Controlling Crime
Through Afore Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 913, 940,
957-58 (1967).
5. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922.
6. Title I of OCCA-70, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-39 (1970) authorizes special grand juries
to investigate organized crime. Title 11, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970), collects and re-
forms testimonial immunity provisions previously scattered throughout the Code. See
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thirteen sections of the Act. Of the remaining six substantive sec-
tions, only three deal specifically with organized crime-as opposed
to crime in general. 7 One of these sections increases sentences for
"dangerous offenders";" another outlaws conducting a gambling
business.9
The last substantive section of the Act dealing specifically with
organized crime, Title IX,'0 is an attempt to halt organized crime's
incursion into legitimate business." Section 196212 defines three new
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-11, 51-56, 104-48, 172-94. Title II, 28 U.S.C. § 1826
(1970), provides penalties to be imposed for refusal to testify after a grant of in-
munity. Title IV, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970), deals with perjury. Title V, 84 Stat. 933,
authorizes security measures to protect witnesses. It was not assigned a place in the
United States Code; it defines certain powers Congress has now awarded to the At-
torney General. Title VI, 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1970), outlines deposition procedures. Title
VII, 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970) attempts to limit the applicability of the "exclusionary
rule." See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. One of the remaining three is the separability section. Title XIII-General
Provisions, 84 Stat. 922. The other two sections are: (1) Title XI-Regulation of Ex-
plosives, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-48 (1970) and (2) Title VII-National Commission on In-
dividual Rights, 84 Stat. 935, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1119-21.
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78 (1970), provides a thirty-year sentence for habitual and
otherwise "dangerous" offenders; those with racketeering backgrounds are defined as
dangerous tinder the statute.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (§ 1955 held
constitutional).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970). Two procedural sections were enacted to aid in
the enforcement of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964, 1968 (1970). Section 1964 provides that
the Attorney General may proceed in a civil action against a racketeer who violates
any part of § 1962 and outlines the penalties to be imposed. The purpose of these
provisions, see Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 151-52, 393-96, 405-08; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 79-83, 125-26, was probably to permit the Attorney General to skirt
the bounds of criminal safeguards. The potential for abuse of the power to proceed
civilly as well as criminally has been noted in another context. Duke, Prosecutions
for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76
YALE L.J. 1 (1966).
Section 1968 describes the "civil investigative demand." Civil investigative demand is
a term of art borrowed from antitrust law. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 43-44
(1967). Through the use of this technique, a witness can be compelled to testify and
to produce documents, apparently even if the evidence so supplied would tend to in-
criminate him. See Duke, supra, at 49.
11. A special committee of the American Bar Association has insisted that the
evidence is clear that organized crime, which takes billions of dollars-mostly in
cash and mostly untaxed-annually from the American public, has broadened its
operations by infiltrating and taking over legitimate businesses . . . . Organized
crime, therefore, is a major threat to the proper functioning of the American
economic system . . . . When organized crime moves into a business, it customarily
brings all the techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal
businesses.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 76.
The list of legitimate businesses in which organized crime is reputedly involved in-
cludes advertising, florist shops, car dealerships, football franchises, real estate, and
securities. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 76-77. The methods used to gain control
over such legitimate businesses reportedly are extortion, violence, collection of gambling
or loan shark debts, and various "scams," e.g., bankruptcy frauds, and collecting in-
surance after the deliberate arson of a business which failed to repay a loan. Id. at
77. This information was supplied by the Justice Department; the Department pro-
vided no further detail. See 8 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2060 (1970) (speech by Att'y Gen.
Mitchell to American Bankers Ass'n, on infiltration of the banking industry).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
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offenses: (1) investment of "dirty money," i.e., income earned or de-
rived from illegal racketeering activity;' 3  (2) takeover and control
of a business through racketeering activity; 14 and (3) operation of
a business through racketeering activity.15 "Racketeering activity" is
a shorthand phrase for those offenses believed to be commonly and
frequently committed by organized crime figures.10
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, Title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income or the proceeds of such income, in the ac-
quisition of any enterprise which is engaged in or the activities of which affect in-
terstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for
purposes of investment, and without intention of controlling or participating in
the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful
under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the
members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of
racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt if such purchases do
not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any
one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or
more directors of the issuer.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activity of which affects interstate or foreign commerce.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering or through
collection of an unlawful debt.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1970) defines "racketeering activity" as any one of roughly
thirty-five offenses. Among these are the most serious offenses in Title 18. The fol-
lowing is a list of the offenses and their maximum penalties. Those in Title 18
of the 1970 edition of the United States Code include § 1111 (murder in the first
degree) death or life imprisonment; § 1111 (murder in the second degree) life im-
prisonment or any term of years; § 1112 (manslaughter) 10 years; § 1201 (kidnapping)
life or an), term of years; § 1202 (transportation and possession of ransom money)
.10,000, 10 years, or both; 8§ 1081-84 (personal gambling) varying penalties; § 81
(arson) $1,000, 5 years, or both ($5,000, 20 years, or both if someone endangered);
§ 2111 (maritime robbery) 15 years; § 2112 (theft of government property) 15 years;
§ 2113 (bank robbery) $5,000, 20 years, or both; §§ 1001-02 (general fraud) $10,000.
5 years, or both; § 152 (bankruptcy fraud) $5,000, 5 years, or both; § 201 (bribery)$10,000, 2 years, or both; § 224 (sports bribery) $10,000, 5 years, or both; §§ 471-73
(counterfeit securities) $5,000, 15 years, or both; § 659 (felonious theft from interstate
commerce) $5,000, 10 years, or both; § 664 (embezzlement from pension fund) $10,000,
5 years, or both; §§ 891-94 (extortionate credit transactions) $10,000, 20 years, or both;
§ 1341 (mail fraud) $1,000, 5 years, or both; § 1343 (wire fraud) $1,000, 5 years, or
both; § 2503 (jury or witness tampering) $5,000, 5 years, or both; § 1510 (obstruction
of criminal investigation) $5,000, 5 years, or both; § 1511 (obstruction of enforcement
of gambling laws) $20,000, 5 years, or both; § 1951 (interference with commerce by
threats or violence) $10,000, 20 years, or both; § 1952 (travel in aid of racketeering
enterprise) $10,000, 5 years, or both; § 1953 (interstate transportation of wagering para-
phernalia) $10,000, 5 years, or both; § 1954 (influencing operation of employee benefit
plan) $10,000, 3 years, or both; § 1955 (operation of illegal gambling business) $20,000,
5 years, or both; § 2314 (interstate transportation of stolen property) $10,000, 10
years, or both; § 2315 (sale or receipt of stolen property) $10,000, 10 years, or both;
§ 2421 (transporting female for white slavery), $5,000, 5 years, or both; § 2422 (causing
female to be transported for white slavery) $5,000, 5 years, or both; § 2423 (causing
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The criminal penalty imposed for a violation of any of the pro-
hibitions of § 1962 is a fine of $25,000, imprisonment for twenty
years, or both, plus forfeiture of any interest the defendant has
acquired or maintained in a business in violation of Title IX.17
These offenses carry the most severe maximum penalty authorized
in Title 18 of the United States Code except for homicide offenses,
This Note will examine § 1962(a), 19 the prohibition against in-
vestment of "dirty money." This subsection deserves critical exam-
ination, first, because its language raises difficult problems of statu-
tory interpretation,2 0 which, once resolved, may result in increasing
the government's burden of proof beyond that burden contemplated
by the advocates of § 1962(a). This Note will explore the am-
biguities in the Act and suggest a construction to resolve those
ambiguities. Second, because the Act on its face imposes no mens
rea requirement, the Note examines this omission and proposes a
mens rea standard for § 1962(a). Third, the Note evaluates the prob-
lems of proof the Act presents and concludes that it defined a large-
ly unprovable crime. The Note, therefore, recommends that Con-
gress in its present deliberations on recodification of Title 1821 con-
minor female to be transported for white slavery) $10,000, 10 years, or both; § 2424
(failure to report alien status of resident of house of prostitution) $2,000, 2 years, or
both. Those outside Title 18 include 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (Drug Prevention Control
and Treatment Act) varying penalties depending on offense; 29 U.S.C. § 186 (illegal
payments to labor organization) $10,000, 1 year, or both; 29 U.S.C. § 501 (embezzlement
of union funds) $10,000, 5 years, or both.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970) restores the use of criminal forfeiture, a penalty which
was abolished by the first Congress. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. There have been no convictions or indictments under § 1962(a) since it was
passed. Letter from Ass't Att'y Gen. Henry Petersen to author, Mar. 23, 1973 (on file
with the Yale Law Journal). Section 1962(a) has thus never been interpreted by the
courts. In King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the court interpreted the
venue provisions of the civil enforcement section, but did not pass on any substantive
ambiguities in § 1962.
20. It is unclear whether the statute is sufficiently vague to run afoul of the "void
for vagueness" doctrine. This doctrine has in the past generally been applied only to
criminal statutes which potentially infringe First Amendment rights. See Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964); United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 250-70
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on
the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes Dis-
pleasing Police Officers, and The Like, 3 Crim. L. Bull. 205 (1967); see generally Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
21. Title 18 of the United States Code is presently undergoing another revision and
recodification. See Note, Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code,
81 YALE L.J. 1209 (1972). Two of the three proposed revisions would apparently
retain § 1962(a) in essentially its present form. See S.1, § 2-9C(a)(2), 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S.1400, § 1861(a)(2), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). On the other hand, the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws recommends no provisions
analogous to § 1962(a). See NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws,
FINAL REPoRT (1970), reprinted in Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 129 (1971).
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sider drastic amendment of § 1962(a) or its elimination from the
United States Code.
I
Section 1962(a), despite its deceiving simplicity, is an extremely
ambiguous statute and raises difficult problems of statutory construc-
tion. The first problem concerns the scope of the section, i.e., who
is a proper defendant under § 1962(a). While the statute, as reflected
in its popular name, appears to be aimed at investment of "dirty
money" by organized crime figures, the language of the statute can
be read to cover persons not associated with organized crime but
who have either received money from organized crime activity or
who have committed crimes associated with organized crime figures.
The second problem of statutory construction involves the relation
of § 1962(a) to the statute of limitations, viz., whether a § 1962(a)
prosecution can be used to circumvent the bar of the statute for
crimes which are alleged to prove a "pattern" of criminal activity.
The third problem of statutory construction involves the usage in
the statute of the word "proceeds."
Section 1962(a) is clearly aimed at the person who invests the
proceeds of his own racketeering activity.22 However, the unquali-
fied generality of the words "any person who has received any in-
come derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity," raises the issue of whether § 1962(a) extends to persons
who did not commit any racketeering acts but who receive money
or other income from a racketeer and then use it in their busi-
nesses, with no intent to make the income of those businesses pri-
marily available for further racketeering activity.23 Consider, for
example, the following situation: A racketeer gives money to a person
who has not committed acts of racketeering and with whom the
racketeer wishes to ingratiate himself; the money is an investment
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970) states that "any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
lection of an unlawful debt . . ." is liable under the statute. (Emphasis added).
23. A suggested interpretation in the SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 158, seems
at first glance to resolve the ambiguity:
The term "racketeering activity" is a key statutory term. Under proposed section
1962, below, the racketeering activity is one of the three prerequisites to com-
mission of an offense.
However, even this is insufficient as a precise explanation and limitation of the scope
of § 1962(a). While the Report notes that there must be racketeering activity for a
violation to occur, it does not indicate whether the person who committed the
racketeering acts must be the same person who is indicted under § 1962(a). The reason
for the continued confusion is that the phrase "proceeds of such income" would seem
to implicate someone who had not himself committed any racketeering acts.
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in the person's business, not a bribe..2 4 Would the innocent (non-
racketeering) taker be a potential defendant under § 1962(a)? Since
such a businessman has received income "indirectly" from a rack-
eteering activity he arguably could be considered a defendant under
the Act .2  The inclusion of the clause "in which such person has
participated as a principal" was presumably intended to clear up
this ambiguity, but it is not clear from the placement of the clause
in the statute whether it modifies "a pattern of racketeering activity"
as well as "the collection of an unlawful debt," or just the latter
phrase.2 6 If it modifies only the latter phrase, the innocent taker
could be a potential defendant under § 1962(a).
Congress should clarify the uncertainty in statutory language, pre-
sumably by making it clear that the clause modified both phrases.
In the meantime, courts should apply accepted principles of criminal
responsibility in construction of the statute. If the taker knew that
the investor was a racketeer and thus that the funds might have
been derived from racketeering activity, but had no other connec-
tion with the racketeering activity, he would, if he is criminally
liable at all, probably be considered an accessory after the fact2 7 to
24. For example, if a man whose brother is in the city government is starting
a new business and needs capital, the racketeer may become an investor. The racketeer
would arguably be chargeable under § 1962(a). The question is whether the new busi-
nessman would also be chargeable, since he "used" money derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity.
25. A court could define the word "income" consistent with the tax definition, thus
excluding bona fide loans or capital contributions from the term. See INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954 §§ 102, 118; James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); United States v.
Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968). However,
such an approach might well be too mechanical. For example, if a racketeer received
from another racketeer a payment which could be conceptualized as a "loan" or a
"capital contribution," a tax definition of "income" would exclude investment of such
income from the scope of § 1962(a). A broad and flexible concept of income may well
be preferable. Similar difficulties surround a judicial definition of the word "indi-
rectly"; limiting the meaning of "indirectly" to only the proceeds of racketeering con-
ducted by subordinates or co-conspirators may put interpretative pressure on that defi-
nition and permit the exclusion of racketeering proceeds from the statute's operation.
For example, if a racketeer invested the proceeds of illegal activity into a front busi.
ness and then, after "cleaning" the money (i.e., passing it through a legitimate in-
come producing operation) invested in another business he intends to subvert, a narrow
definition of "'indirectly" might exclude that second investment from the scope of§ 1962(a).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970), quoted in full in note 13 supra. A proposed
revision of § 1962(a), S.1, § 2-9CI(a)(2), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), would substitute
the word "accomplice" for the word "principal."
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1970):
Accessory after the fact: Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United
States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the offender in
order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory
after the fact.
Except as otherwise provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the
fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprison-
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the § 1962(a) violation.28 Accessories after the fact, under present
federal law, face no liability for the crime itself, but only for ob-
struction of justice or for interference with a criminal investigation..2 0
Since Congress, in enacting OCCA-70, did not state that it intended
to change this rule, courts should hold that the taker who merely
knew that the investor was a racketeer is not a potential defendant
under § 1962(a).
If the taker not only knew that the investor was a racketeer, but
also had some indirect connection with the racketeering activity
from which the funds were derived, that is, did not commit the
racketeering acts himself, but rather counseled the actor or solicited
the activity, he would probably be considered an accessory before
the fact and be liable equally with the principal for the racketeering
activity as a principal.30 An example of this status is the organized
crime figure who is a "skimmer's" superior.31 Courts should con-
strue § 1962(a) broadly enough to include such persons, because
they would be "principals" in the crime of investment.
If, however, § 1962(a) is given a broad reading, that is, if its pur-
pose is to restrict the seemingly "legitimate" activities of racketeers
as well as their illegal activities in an effort to deter the inter-
vention of organized crime into legitimate business, then both the
hypothetical businessman and the skimmer's superior would be po-
tential defendants under the statute.3 2
ment or fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the
punishment of the principal, or both; or if the principal be punishable by death,
the accessory shall be imprisoned not more than ten years.
Accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
28. If the investor did not know that the money was derived from racketeering
activity, he may not be criminally liable at all. See pp. 1502-10. If he knew that the
money was "dirty" then he would be liable as an accessory after the fact. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3 (1970). However, while the matter is not free from doubt, it would appear that
such a person would not be an "aider and abettor," and hence a principal, because
he would lack the necessary criminal intent. An "aider and abettor" must "willfully
and knowingly" associate himself with the criminal intent of the principal; "mete
presence at the scene of the crime" is not sufficient. Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S.
442 (1893); United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724, 732 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1126 (1972); United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 919-22 (6th Cir. 1972); Snyder
v. United States, 448 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 1971). Since it is unlikely that the hypo-
thetical defendant shared in the racketeering activity and subsequent investment "wil-
fully and knowingly," he would not be an aider and abettor. If it could be proven that
the hypothetical defendant knew that the money he received was "dirty" and that the
investor was a racketeer, the case would perhaps go the other way. The central issue
seems to involve the definition of the proper mens rea for the crime itself, a subject
which will be explored in more detail in pp. 1502-10 infra.
29. See Virgin Islands v. Acquino, 378 F.2d 540, 553 (3d Cir. 1967); Skelly v. United
States, 76 F.2d 483, 488 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 757 (1935).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); Robinson v. United States, 262 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1959);
Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942); note 24 supra.
31. A "skimmer" removes a percentage of profits from legal gambling houses for
distribution to various underworld figures, his superiors.
32. See p. 1507 infra.
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Another ambiguity as to who are proper defendants under § 1962(a)
is whether the person indicted thereunder must be a member of a
criminal syndicate.33 Nothing in § 1962(a) or any other part of OCCA-
70 specifically imposes on a prosecutor the requirement of proving
that a person indicted under § 1962(a) is a member of a criminal
syndicate. However, the intended focus of the section, as reflected in
the Findings and Purposes,34 indicates that the dangers posed by
criminal syndicates are the raison d'etre of the Act.35 The particu-
larly harsh penalties imposed on a violator of § 1962(a) are pre-
sumably justified by Congress' view of the seriousness of the threat
of organized crime-not the threat posed by ordinary, independent
criminals. It is true that it would be difficult to prove an individual
accused's membership in a specific criminal syndicate. If the statute's
penalties are to be imposed on the proper persons, however, proof
33. Despite the intensive debate of the subject, see note 4 supra, Congress appar-
ently is convinced that a monolithic criminal organization exists and drafted OCCA-70
to cope with it. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 35-43; Senate Hearings, supra note
4, at 107, 114, 124-28; cf. United States v. Podell, 369 F. Supp. 151, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (OCCA-70 provisions permitting depositions to preserve testimony, 18 U.S.C. § 3503
(1970), limited to organized crime figures, a fact which by statute the Attorney General
must certify to; court may look behind this certification to determine that organized
crime figures are involved).
In In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973), the court held that OCCA-70 im-
munity provisions were not limited to use against organized crime figures. As the
court noted, id. at 1217-18, those immunity provisions were a codification of prior
general immunity statutes and were not enacted specifically to deal with organized
crime, as the history of § 1962(a) indicates that it was. See note 11 supra.
34. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement of Findings and Purposes):
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly so-
phisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate busi-
ness and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's
economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere
with free competition, seriously burden interstate commerce, threaten domestic
security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and
(5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the un-
lawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions
and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
35. See notes 4, 5 & 11 supra and 112 infra; McClellan, The Organized Crime Control
Act (S30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970).
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of this connection seems necessary.3 6 This ambiguity is seemingly
resolved by the requirement of a "pattern of racketeering activity."
The term "pattern" suggests continuing, interdependent criminal ac-
tivity; as used in the statute, however, the term "pattern" does not
necessarily require proof of membership in a criminal syndicate.
The Act prohibits investment of money derived from a "pattern
of racketeering activity." A "pattern of racketeering activity" exists
under the terms of § 1962(a) if the accused has committed "at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity . . . . , In common usage,
the term "pattern" is applied to a combination of qualities or acts
forming a consistent or characteristic arrangement. Use of the term
pattern in connection with two racketeering acts committed by the
same person suggests that the two acts must have greater interrela-
tionship than simply commission by a common perpetrator. It is
not clear, however, if the two acts were intended by the drafters
to be related, and, if so, how. The acts could be related, for ex-
ample, if they involve the violation of the same substantive law, that
is, both involving bribery or both involving the use of extortionate
methods. The acts could also be related if they were part of a par-
ticular continuing criminal activity, e.g., interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia and operation of an illegal gambling busi-
ness, rather than isolated occurrences. The acts could even be mini-
mally related if they were committed by a member of a criminal
syndicate. Nothing in the definition of "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity" quoted above, however, requires proof of any such interre-
latedness.38 Thus, as it is presently written, § 1962(a) could be used
against an independent criminal 9 who in no sense was the intended
target of § 1962(a). 40
36. Ambiguous statutory language is generally interpreted with a view to its pur-
pose, whether the statute is criminal or not. See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18
(1948); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). A court, faced with this rather unclear statute,
could with considerable justification limit its application to those persons proved to
be members of criminal syndicates.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1970).
38. But cf. S.1, § 2-9C(a)(2), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (would amend § 1962(a)
to have it read "two or more related, not isolated, acts of racketeering activity").
39. For the list of crimes designated as "racketeering activity" see note 16 supra.
No claim is made that only organized crime figures commit such crimes.
40. A more acceptable definition of pattern is contained in a suggested revision
of the Federal Criminal Code, see S.1400, § 1861(b)(2), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973):
Pattern of racketeering activity means two or more separate acts of racketeering
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A further ambiguity in § 1962 involves the meaning of the word
"acts." It is unclear whether two prior racketeering convictions would
be necessary. Conceivably, a § 1962(a) conviction could be based
on two prior racketeering "acts" for which the defendant was never
convicted. The definition of the term "acts" would be crucial when
a prosecution is commenced for investment on the basis of a prior
racketeering act if the prosecution of that act today would be barred
by the statute of limitations.41
The use of the word "act" instead of "conviction" suggests that
the drafters suspected that a typical defendant under § 1962 would
probably not have been convicted of the prior racketeering acts.
The following situation may have been envisaged as typical: A per-
son who committed two acts of racketeering, one in 1960 and one
in 1970, invested in 1972. He has not been convicted of the prior
racketeering acts and these acts are the only acts for which the
government now has proof. He could be charged with and tried
for the 1970 racketeering offense and the 1972 investment but he
could neither be charged with nor tried for the 1960 offense, be-
cause the statute of limitations on that offense has run. The ques-
tion is whether the government could nevertheless use its proof of
the 1960 offense as part of its case against the defendant under
§ 1962(a). The statute's use of the term "acts" instead of "convic-
tions" suggests that the answer would be affirmative.
This explanation of the use of the term "acts" rather than "con-
victions" is admittedly speculative. What motivated Congress does
not appear on the face of the statute, and there are no clues to be
found in the legislative history of OCCA-70. The drafters may have
weighed the policy considerations underlying the statute of limita-
activity, committed after October 15, 1970 [effective date of OCCA-70], which
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and
are not isolated events.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (1970) (five year statute of limitations for noncapital
offenses). An explicit attempt to avoid the statute of limitations is contained in a
proposed revision of § 1962(a). See S.1, §§ 1-3B1(g), 2-9C1(c), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
§ 1-3Bl(g) provides:
Notwithstanding that the period of limitations has expired, a prosecution is timely
commenced (1) for an offense included in the offense charged, if as to the offense
charged the period of limitation has not expired . . . and there is, after the
evidence on either side is closed at trial, sufficient evidence to sustain a con-
viction of the offense charged . ...
§ 2-9C(a) states:
Offense-A person is guilty of racketeering activity if:
(2) having received income from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the
collection of an unlawful debt, in the conduct of which he was an accomplice, he:
(i) uses, or
(ii) invests
any part of such income or the proceeds of such income in the acquisition of
any interest in or the establishment or operation of any enterprise.
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tions42 against the desirability of successfully prosecuting racketeers
and decided that the latter was more important. However, had Con-
gress expressly wanted to revise the statute of limitations to include
the above-described situation, it certainly could have done so. It
chose not to; it chose instead to use the ambiguous term "acts."
A resolution of the ambiguity would seem to require either a re-
vision of the statute of limitations or the replacement of the term
"acts" with the term "convictions." Congress should, therefore, at a
minimum amend the statute to deal with this ambiguity. In the
meantime courts should follow the principle of statutory construction
which resolves all ambiguities in favor of the policy of repose un-
derlying the statute of limitations43 and interpret the word "acts"
to mean "convictions" whenever the government alleges racketeering
acts upon which conviction is barred by the statute of limitations.44
Another ambiguity in § 1962(a) involves the use of the term "pro-
ceeds." The definition of this term will be crucial in determining
the scope of the one exception contained in § 1962(a): A racketeer
may purchase stocks on the open market with "dirty money" as long
as his holdings do not exceed one percent of the total outstanding
securities of the issuer.4 5 If the racketeer could "clean" all of his
12. Four policy reasons underlying the statute of limitations are: (1) the desirability
of convictions based on fresh evidence, (2) the value to defendants of being freed of
the fear of prosecution, (3) the reduced demand for retribution as time passes, and
(4) the reduced need for rehabilitation as time passes (if the defendant does not
commit any other criminal acts). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1956), at 16-17. See People v. Hryciuk, 36 Ill. 2d 500, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967); Note,
The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAx. L. REV. 476, 485-93 (1968).
43. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971); United States v.
Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1922); United States v. Moriarty, 327 F. Supp.
1045, 1047 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Jones v. Rabinowitz, 296 F. Supp. 123, 125 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F. Supp. 406, 408 (W.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 401
F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968), rert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971); United States v. Gross, 159
F. Supp. 316, 317 (D. Nev. 1958).
44. If the term "acts" were not so interpreted, the statute might also raise a serious
double jeopardy problem in the following situation: A defendant was tried for an act
which is now included within § 1961, see note 16 supra, prior to the passage of
OCCA-70 and was acquitted; after the passage of the Act, he is tried on a § 1962(a)
charge and evidence of the previous racketeering act upon which the defendant was
tried constitutes the government's proof of one of the two racketeering "acts." The
defendant is thus forced to prove himself innocent twice, a requirement inconsistent
with the purposes of the double jeopardy clause. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
443 (1970); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896). This view of double jeopardy
involves a res judicata principle. See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTCE 0.148[2], at 2763-74
(2d ed. 1965); Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L.
R V. 217, 319, 329 (1954); Perkins, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 1960 ILL.
L.F. 533, 561-71. This problem could be solved if "acts" were interpreted to mean
"convictions" in the above-described circumstances since the res judicata principles
underlying double jeopardy would be inapplicable if the prior issue was resolved
against the defendant.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970). The rationale of the exception to § 1962(a) is not
immediately apparent. One possible explanation is that it was required by Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), which was handed down while the statute was being
drafted. The issue in Powell was whether a statute which made public drunkenness a
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dirty money by investing it within the exception to § 1962(a) and
then reinvest the proceeds of these initial investments outside the
exception (e.g., in a legitimate business), the deterrent effect of the
Act would be seriously impaired. A broad construction of the term
"proceeds"46 would prevent a racketeer from circumventing § 1962(a)
by first investing in securities within the one percent exemption.
II
The most serious ambiguity in the language of § 1962(a)-an am-
biguity which raises additional difficult issues of statutory interpre-
tation and which poses troubling questions about the compatibility
of OCCA-70 with the American system of criminal justice-is the
apparent lack of a mens rea requirement. An analysis of this issue
requires an initial examination of the purposes of criminal laws
and the role mens rea plays with regard to those purposes.
There are essentially two types of criminal laws. Laws of the first
type are those which prohibit certain behavior because it is harmful
per se or deemed harmful when measured against some higher, moral
law; this type of criminal law can be labeled "wrong on principle."
Acts which fall into this category are made criminal not solely be-
cause society believes that their proscription will necessarily prevent
the reoccurrence of such behavior (although society has that hope),
but also because the behavior is considered wrong in and of itself.
Behavior which is wrong on principle is considered "blameworthy,"
and society would proscribe such behavior even if the proscription
clearly would not prevent the occurrence of such behavior. Murder,
crime was invalid on the authority of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
which had invalidated laws punishing "status" as cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment. The majority opinions in Powell held that the statute punished the act
of public drunkenness rather than the status of being a drunk, since a person would
not violate the statute if he drank only in private. 392 U.S. at 532, 538, 541-44,
54849, 553-54.
The drafters of § 1962(a) may have read Powell to render a statute unconstitutional
which penalized any investment of proceeds of racketeering activity because it would
punish the "status" of being a racketeer. This possibility though is speculative and
farfetched. For it seems clear that even a statute which punished all investment
would pass muster under Robinson and Powell: The person with ill-gotten gains need
not invest his tainted money and enrich himself further. He may return the dirty money
to its rightful owner, give the money away, or spend it on consumer goods. It is his
conduct, his investment of dirty money, which is punished, not his status.
46. The definition of "proceeds" contained in UNIFORM COMIERCIAL CODE § 9-306
would provide the basis for such a broad reading:
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or
other disposition of collateral or proceeds . . . . Money, checks, deposit accounts
and the like are "cash proceeds," all other proceeds are "non-cash proceeds."
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theft, and common law crimes47 are examples of behavior which is
"wrong on principle."
Laws of the second type are those which prohibit certain behavior
in order to effect some social policy; that is, society believes that
by outlawing act X it will be able to achieve policy Y. If society
did not believe that outlawing act X would achieve policy Y, it would
not prohibit X. In short, behavior X is not considered "blame-
worthy." 48 Society forbids child labor in large part to promote chil-
dren's welfare and safety; society prohibits the accidental inaccurate
labeling of drugs to guard against improper drug use and prevent
drug poisoning.40 Of course, the proscribed behavior might be con-
sidered somewhat "wrong on principle," but such a rationale is the
weak rather than the strong justification for adjudging such behavior
criminal."° This second type of criminal law thus prohibits behavior
which is "wrong for policy reasons."
In an overall sense, all criminal laws are motivated by policy rea-
sons-that is, the promotion of public health, welfare and safety. The
distinction between that conduct which is "wrong on principle" and
that which is "wrong for policy reasons" is one which is easily col-
lapsed. The basis of the distinction, however, is this: Conduct which
is considered "wrong on principle" has an element of blameworthi-
ness; blameworthiness is not significantly present in conduct which
is considered "wrong for policy reasons." The distinction is thus not
based on the "harmfulness" of the conduct.rl
The primary functional difference between crimes which are
"wrong on principle" and those "wrong for policy reasons" involves
the intent of the actor. Crimes which are "wrong on principle" are
47. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52, 260-62 (1952); J. BENTHAM,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 70-87, 204, 207, 213-21
(1907); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 212-46 (2d ed. 1947); G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 10-11, 592-96 (2d ed. 1960). See generally MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954 ; id., § 2.04(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1953); Binivance, The Ethical Foundation of Criminal Liability, 33 FORD. L. REv. 1
(1964); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
48. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-59 (1952); People v. Roby, 52
Mich. 577, 579, 18 N.W. 365, 366 (1884); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575,
155 A.2d 825 (1959). See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
55 (1933). The distinction between "principles" and "policies," as used in this Note,
is treated at length by Professor Wellington. See Wellington, Common Law Rules
and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221,
222-54 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Common Law Rules]. See also Dworkin, Social Rules
and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972).
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1970); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 US. 277. 284-85 (1943); Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 55 F. Supp. 234, 236
(W.D. Mo. 1944), modified, 146 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1945).
50. Cf. Common Law Rules, supra note 48, at 222-23.
51. Cf. id. at 224-25.
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"based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. [They] postu-
late a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and
doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong. '"52 If the actor did not in
fact make that choice, but "accidentally" committed an otherwise
criminal act, there would be no "crime" because there is no "blame-
worthiness" resulting from a free choice to do wrong.5 3 For crimes
which are "wrong for policy reasons," such considerations do not
apply. The law in such instances is unconcerned with the actor's
"blameworthiness," since it punishes the effect of the acts rather than
the "vicious will." 54
The law's concern with the intent of the actor is reflected in the
doctrine of mens rea. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
criminal liability for an act will not be imposed unless the actor
intended to commit the act, i.e., the actor must have acted with mens
rea.55 Although the Supreme Court has stopped short of declaring
that mens rea is a constitutional requirement in criminal statutes,5
it has generally construed penal statutes lacking the element of mens
rea on their face to include such a requirement. 7
52. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952), citing Pound, Introduction
to P. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927).
53. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 42 (DeWolfe ed. 1963): "criminal liability
. . . is founded on blameworthiness." A particularly significant example of the re-
quirement of mens rea or punishment of the "vicious will" and its relation to blame-
worthiness is found in the case law holding possessors of stolen goods innocent un-
less the state proves the possessor knew the goods were stolen. See United States v.
Koran. 453 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1972); Pauldino v. United States, 379 F.2d 170 (10th
Cir. 1967); Corey v. United States, 305 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
956 (1963). To be sure courts have generally permitted an inference of such knowledge
from unexplained possession shortly after the theft but the inference is limited to
unexplained possession. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); United States
v. Howard, 483 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 850 (1974); 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2513, at 417-24 (3d ed. 1940).
54. See p. 1503 supra.
55. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
228, 231 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101, 156 (1945).
56. See Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of
Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 378-91 (1966); Packer, Mens Rea & The
Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 110-27. Professor Dubin in his lengthy article
argues that constitutional due process concepts proscribe criminal punishment without
proof of mens rea. Particularly, he argues that the requirements of definiteness and
notice (see note 20 supra), the prohibition on ex post facto laws, and the Eighth
Amendment combine to prohibit criminal punishment for acts the defendant could
not under any standard of care avoid. See Dubin, supra, at 375-93.
57. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Morissette v. United States, 312
U.S. 246 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), are examples of this
variety of statutory construction; cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850
(1956); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1235-37 (Tent. ed. 1958); sources cited
in notes 55, 70 infra. But see United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (statute,
construed by the Court not to require proof of mens rea, outlawed the sale of narcotics;
while the Court noted that mens rea was usually a necessary element of a crime, this
was not true of "statutory" crimes, even when harsh penalties are involved).
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Lambert v. Californias is a particularly dramatic example of the
impact of the mens rea principle on statutory construction. The Cali-
fornia statute scrutinized in Lambert made it an offense for a person
who had been convicted of a felony to remain in a city for five
days without registering with the police. The Court held that since
the defendant's "default was entirely innocent" and since "no ele-
ment of wilfullness is by terms included in the ordinance nor read
into it by the California court[s]," there could be no conviction un-
der the statute.r9 Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said that
the statute failed to provide sufficient "notice" to a potential de-
fendant and hence criminal liability could not be imposed. 60 Al-
though the usual rule is that ignorance of the law is not a defense,6'
this rule was not applicable in Lambert because the statute involved
was an unusual one. Specifically, Justice Douglas noted that the regis-
tration law was not the type of law that anyone, even a convicted
felon, would have reason to believe existed.62 Given this fact, mere
failure to register could not be considered culpable; liability could
not be imposed without some evidence that the defendant knew of
the duty to register. Such evidence would amount to the govern-
ment's showing that the defendant knowingly did not register, that
is, that she intended not to register. A mens rea requirement was
thus read into the statute.63
Social policy statutes, the penal statutes which prohibit certain be-
havior for policy reasons constitute the major exception to the rule
that criminal liability will not be imposed unless mens rea is present. 64
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, in dissent in Lambert, while admitting
that courts often, as a matter of statutory construction, "attribute to
58. 355 U.S. 225 (1958). See Packer, supra note 56, for a lengthy discussion of this case.
59. 355 U.S. at 227, 229.
60. See id. at 227-29.
61. See Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04
(Prop. Official Draft 1962); Packer, supra note 56, at 145.
62. 355 U.S. at 229.
63. The Court in Freed and Professor Packer both viewed Lambert as a mens rca
case. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608 (1971); Packer, supra note 56, at
127-37; note 69 infra.
64. Offenses such as felony-murder and statutory rape seemingly constitute excep-
tions to the rule that mens rea is required for all nonsocial policy crimes. See sources
cited in Packer, supra note 56, at 140-42. These offenses, however, are hybrids; they
contain dominant elements of blameworthiness, but also reflect certain social policies
designed to deter felonies and sexual intercourse with underage women. In some
jurisdictions recent cases seem to discourage recognition of such hybrids in favor of
a uniform requirement of mens tea for all crimes (including pure social policy crimes).
See, e.g., People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956); Noble v. State, 248
Ind. 101, 223 N.E.2d 755 (1967); State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 189 P.2d 993 (1948); People
v. Post Std. Co., 13 N.Y.2d 185, 245 N.Y.S.2d 377, 195 N.E.2d 48 (1963); People v.
Estreich, 272 A.D. 698, 75 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1947).
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a statute the requirement of mental intent," argued that the regis-
tration law aimed at the "achievement of some social betterment
rather than the punishment of crimes as cases of mala in se" and
that such laws were clearly constitutional under numerous prece-
dents. 65
Courts have not been very precise in discussing the distinction be-
tween those crimes which require mens rea and those crimes which
do not. The result is that many decisions speak in general terms
of the relative severity of punishment imposed for different types of
crimes, thus suggesting that the difference in penalties distinguishes
crimes which require mens rea from crimes which do not.'6 Whatever
validity this view ever had, however, it surely cannot be maintained
after United States v. Freed.T The distinction apparently adopted in
Freed is the one suggested earlier and seemingly adopted by Justice
Frankfurter in his dissent in Lambert:6 Crimes which involve con-
duct "wrong on principle" must involve mens rea; crimes which in-
volve conduct which is "wrong for policy reasons" need not. 9 It
follows that, in order to determine whether a statute will be inter-
65. 355 U.S. at 230-31.
66. Traditionally, the penalties for violation of social policy criminal statutes were
light, a fact commonly emphasized by courts upholding such statutes despite the lack
of a mens rea requirement or interpreting such statutes not to require mens rea.
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952); Holdridge v. United States,
282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960); People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms Co., 225
N.Y. 25, 32-33, 121 N.E. 474, 477 (1918) (Cardozo, J.); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397
Pa. 575, 255 A.2d 825 (1959). But see United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922),
discussed in note 57 supra.
67. 401 U.S. 601 (1971). In Freed, the Court upheld the Firearm Registration Act,
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-72 (1970), and found that the Act did not require the government
to prove that the defendant knew that the weapon was unregistered. There was no
mention in the Court's opinion of the penalties to be imposed for a violation of
the Act; penalties, however, were sizable: $10,000 fine or 10 years in prison, or both.
26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1970). Defendant's counsel argued that the size of the penalty made
the offense one for which mens rea must be proved. Brief for Appellee at 16-26,
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). However, this argument was implicitly
rejected by the Court. The Court reached a similar result in another case involving a
regulatory statute imposing severe penalties. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250
(1922) (sale of narcotics conviction sustained without proof of knowledge that drugs
were illegal narcotics).
68. 355 U.S. at 230-31; see pp. 1505-06 supra.
69. The Court in Freed did not explicitly base its decision on this distinction;
however, it went to some lengths to explain the nature of the exception to the tra-
ditional rule that mens rea must be a requirement in criminal statutes. The Court
contrasted Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225 (1958), cases in which proof of mens rea was required, with United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), a case which the Court said involved a "regulatory
measure in the interest of public safety" and hence did not require proof of mens
rea. 401 U.S. at 607-09. The government *in Freed had characterized the statute involved
as a regulatory scheme, not as a statute which involved conduct which was malum in se.
See Jurisdictional Statement of appellant at 9-10, United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1971); Brief for Appellant at 25-30. The Court in Freed appears to have accepted
this formulation and to have rejected the argument of the appellees that the statute
involved conduct which was actually blameworthy. Brief for Appellees at 23-25.
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preted to require proof of mens rea, a court must discern the pur-
pose of the statute from its language and legislative history.70 If the
statute proscribes an act because of its "blameworthiness" then proof
of mens rea will be required; if it proscribes an act for policy rea-
sons, no proof of mens rea is necessary.
The purpose behind the prohibition of investment of dirty money
contained in § 1962(a) is ambiguous. One view is that Congress con-
sidered investment of dirty money a blameworthy act because all
the activities of organized crime are blameworthy and threaten Amer-
ican society.7' Another view is that the prohibition of investment
of dirty money was designed as a social policy to prevent corruption
of American business and a resultant decrease in productive economic
activity.72 The scanty and opaque legislative history could be read
to support either of these 
views.
The problem of whether § 1962(a) requires proof of mens rea can
more easily be resolved through the application of two principles of
statutory construction. First, social policy crimes are an exception,
founded on lack of blameworthiness, to the common law rule that
proof of mens rea is a prerequisite to criminal liability; the seeming
lack of a mens rea requirement in § 1962(a) is, therefore, in dero-
gation of common law.73 Statutes in derogation of the common law
are strictly construed and thus courts will not presume, absent a
clear legislative intent, that a particular statute alters the common
law.7 4 Second, statutes punishing social policy crimes have tradition-
ally employed mild penalties.7 5 While this factor no longer serves to
distinguish mens rea crimes from non-mens Yea crimes, it demon-
strates a longstanding practice on the part of legislatures to avoid
harsh sanctions for social policy crimes. The fact that § 1962(a) in-
volves severe penalties is some indication that Congress did not
conceive of § 1962(a) as a social policy statute. Furthermore, the
70. It is the usual practice for the Court to look to legislative history in order to
discern the purpose of a statute. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971); Turner
v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1964); sources cited in note 36 supra.
71. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 941 (Findings 1-3), note 34 supra.
72. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 941 (Finding 4), note 34 supra.
73. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 n.14 (1952); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 577,
155 A.2d 825, 827 (1959); Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv.
1043 (1958); sources cited in note 55 supra.
74. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 381 (1970); Robert C.
Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959); Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331,
1333 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
75. See sources cited in note 66 supra.
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draconian penalties provided by § 1962(a),7 if imposed for non-
blameworthy conduct, may raise Eighth Amendment problems.77
Thus, given a desire to avoid constitutional issues and to uphold
long-established principles, courts should presume, in the absence of
clear legislative intent, that crimes with harsh penalties are not social
policy crimes.78
The conclusion that § 1962(a) does deal with blameworthy con-
duct and therefore must contain some mens rea requirement still
leaves unidentified the particular blameworthy conduct the statute
proscribes and thus the specific nature of the mens rea requirement.t
Two possible explications of the nature of the blameworthy conduct
come to mind. The first is that Congress considered investment of
dirty money itself a blameworthy act, one which should be punished
in its own right. The second is that Congress meant § 1962(a) to be
the attempt version of § 1962(b). 0
One reasonable formulation of the nature of the blameworthy con-
duct proscribed by § 1962(a), with some support in the legislative
history of the section,8' is that § 1962(a) is an "attempt" version
of § 1962(b). Under this formulation of the nature of the blame-
worthy conduct proscribed by § 1962(a), the mens rea requirement
would be the specific intent to do that which is proscribed by
§ 1962(b); that is, intent, by a person aware of the source of the
76. See notes 16-17 supra.
77. The Eighth Amendment question is whether the punishment in § 1962(a) is
"disproportionate" to the crime; since a severe penalty is imposed for conduct which
is not itself blameworthy and since similar punishments are imposed regardless of the
intent of the actor, a defendant could argue that the punishment is impermissibly
arbitrary in relation to the harm caused. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
230-31 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
78. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17
(1968); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 57, at
124041; Common Law Rules, supra note 48, at 263-64.
79. Cf. United States v. Eppinette, 14 Cius.. L. REP. 2093 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 1973);
State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 P. 838 (1922).
80. Compare § 1962(a), quoted in full in note 13 supra, with § 1962(b), quoted in
note 14 supra. Under this view, the act of investment of dirty money if accompanied
by the proper intent would be an attempt to acquire a legitimate business through
racketeering activity. The wording of a proposed revision of § 1962(a) strongly suggests
that the revision is an "attempt" statute. See S.1400, § 1861(a)(2), 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
Generally, in order to prove a person guilty of an attempt, the government must
show that the person committed some act in an effort to perpetrate the crime (actus
reus) and that the person specifically intended to commit the crime (mens rea). The
actus-reus and mens rea together create a "dangerous probability" that the proscribed
act will occur, thus justifying criminal sanctions. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (Holmes, J.); see Merrit v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 660-61,
180 S.E. 395, 398-99 (1935); S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
368-410 (2d ed. 1969); Stuart, Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts, 1968 CRIM. L. REv. 647.




money (i.e., racketeering acts), to invest such money in a business
to acquire or control that business through racketeering activity.8 2
While this formulation of the mens rea requirement has surface
plausibility, and does seem to better justify the particularly severe
sanctions of § 1962(a), it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of
the provision and with the established congressional practice of spe-
cifically labeling all "attempt" statutes as such.83 If Congress con-
sidered investment of dirty money itself a blameworthy act, the mens
rea requirement would be this: Intent to invest dirty money in a
legitimate business with the knowledge that the money was derived
from racketeering activity. Intent to invest, without more, would not
be an acceptable mens rea requirement since it would not include
all of the elements of the offense.8 4
It is within Congress' power to decide that a particular act is
blameworthy.8 5 Congress has often forbidden particular uses of stolen
or embezzled property. Various other provisions in the United States
Code prohibit owning a gambling business, 6 transporting stolen or
embezzled goods in interstate commerce,87 or selling stolen or em-
bezzled goods in interstate commerce.88 Investment of the proceeds
of such sale of stolen goods or profits of a gambling business might
well be considered an extension of the original crime which gave
rise to the income invested. Under this view, the blameworthy con-
82. Section 1962(b) proscribes acquisition of a business through racketeering ac-
tivity. Although the activity described in § 1962(a) is not specifically included in the
list of offenses used to define the term "racketeering activity," see note 16 supra, it
could be considered racketeering activity. Investment in a business by a racketeer could
in some circumstances be a form of extortion (e.g., when a racketeer forces a busi-
nessman to accept an investment or loan under threat of physical violence); various
forms of extortion are included in the list of offenses in note 15 supra. Furthermore,
use of the proceeds of prior racketeering activity to take over a business would itself
be considered acquiring a business "through racketeering activity," since the ability
to control the business, the harmful event, is a product of the money obtained by
racketeering activity; thus there is a takeover "through racketeering activity."
83. The language of § 1962(a) does not label it an "attempt" statute, thus violating
the "plain meaning" canon of statutory construction, see note 93 infra. Congress in
other "attempt" statutes always specifically prohibits "attempts" to do proscribed acts.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1970) (attempt to destroy aircraft or aircraft facilities); id.
§ 33 (attempt to destroy motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities); id. § 351(c) (at-
tempt to kill or kidnap a member of Congress); id. § 752 (attempt to escape); id.
§ 1113 (attempted murder); id. § 1992 (attempt to wreck a train); cf. id. § 1962(d) (pro-
scribes conspiracy to violate § 1962(a) or (b)).
84. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612, 614 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring);
note 53 supra; cf. United States v. Farquhar, Civil No. 72-1088 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 1973).
Apparently this is the mens rea required in a proposed revision of § 1962(a). See
S.1400, § 301(b), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). But see id. § 1861(a)(2).
85. There is, of course, some requirement that Congress act reasonably in designat-
ing certain behavior as "blameworthy." Cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960);
H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 57, at 1240-41; see also Packer, supra note 56, at 151-52.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
87. Id. §§ 659, 1708, 2314.
88. Id. §§ 659, 1708, 2315.
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duct proscribed by the statute would be the original crimes-rack-
eteering acts-and investment would be considered a particularly dan-
gerous use of stolen or embezzled property, or the proceeds of that
property, obtained by those crimes. This view of § 1962(a) accords
with the plain meaning of the language used in the statute,"" and
it is certainly permissible for Congress to increase the penalty for
investment of stolen or embezzled property over that for mere pos-
session of stolen goods.90 In conclusion, then, courts should find the
mens rea of § 1962(a) to be investment with the knowledge that
the money used was derived from racketeering activity.
III
The evidentiary problems which the government will face when it
brings an indictment under § 1962(a) are perhaps the most crippling,
from the government's point of view, of all the flaws contained in
the statute. Section 1962(a) requires for a conviction proof of at
least four elements: 91 (1) that the defendant committed at least two
acts of racketeering or aided and abetted the commission of at least
two acts; 92 (2) that the money invested was derived from that rack-
eteering activity;9 3 (3) that the money so derived was invested in a
legitimate business; and (4) that the defendant invested dirty money
with knowledge that the funds were derived from racketeering ac-
tivity.94 That the defendant committed two racketeering acts and
invested in a legitimate business might well be amenable to "direct"
proof,95 though experience suggests that proving even one racketeer-
ing act is difficult. Proof of two might be an insurmountable ob-
89. Courts generally interpret a statute according to the plain meaning of its
language. See Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459 (1968); Com-
missioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964). On its face, § 1962(a) proscribes only the investment of dirty money and
nothing else. It follows that the proper mens rea is intent to invest dirty money, the
specific act forbidden.
90. See notes 16-17 supra.
91. The government might also have to prove that the investor was a member of
a criminal syndicate. See pp. 1498-99 supra. The fact of membership in a criminal
syndicate will not be provable by inference. Cf. Masiello v. Norton, 264 F. Supp. 1133
(D. Conn. 1973); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41 (1968).
92. This element involves the question of who are proper defendants under§ 1962(a). See p. 1495 supra.
93. It should be noted that the government must prove that the funds invested
were derived from the racketeering activity proved. It would not be sufficient simply
to demonstrate that the source of income of the funds was unknown: § 1962(a) spe-
cifically states that the money invested must have been derived from the racketeering
acts. See note 12 supra.
94. See pp. 1508-10 supra.
95. "Direct" proof, in this context, means identification testimony or material evi-
dence which establishes a fact. See note 98 infra.
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stacle. 6 The two remaining elements are not likely to be amenable
to direct proof;17 hence, the government will seek to rely on in-
ferences. 08
The present test for determining whether an inference" can be
constitutionally employed in a criminal prosecution is that there be
a rational' 0 connection between the proved facts and the presumed
96. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 44; Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 109,
111-12; 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 1076-84; sources cited in note 4 supra.
97. Because money is fungible, it would be virtually impossible for the government
to prove with "direct" proof that the money invested was the money derived from
the racketeering acts, particularly given the length of time likely to elapse between
the various transactions (the two racketeering acts and the investment) and the fact
that money changes hands frequently. Indeed, current evidence suggests that under-
world figures keep detailed records indicating that most of their income is derived
from legitimate sources. See D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 69-70, 77, 291-92; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 44, 76; Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 111, 176.
Proof of criminal intent will require proof that the defendant knew that the money
was dirty; the same proof problems just mentioned would thus have to be faced.
Such proof would probably be directly available only through the defendant's own
testimony in court or through wiretaps. Information about racketeers is virtually im-
possible to obtain from insiders, whose voluntary testimony might endanger their
lives. See Senate Report, supra note 4, at 199. (Title V of OCCA-70, 84 Stat. 933, see
note 6 supra, was designed to deal with this problem.) Granting the defendant im-
munity to preserve his Fifth Amendment rights would be futile, since the likely re-
stilt would be that the defendant could not be prosecuted. See Note, Standards for
Exclusion in Immunity Cases After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 175-81 (1972).
98. To some extent, most proof involves inferences. Because the trier of fact was
not present when the crime was committed, he must, in effect, infer what actually
happened from the testimony of the various witnesses. See United States v. Becker,
62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.). What is commonly meant by the term
"inference," in the context of the law of evidence, is, however, evidence which asks
the trier of fact to reach a certain conclusion by reasoning only from certain sub-
sidiary facts, themselves testified to, which taken together could suggest that an event
occurred. This distinction between "direct" or "testimonial" evidence and inferential
evidence is developed in the case law holding that an inference may not be supported
by another inference. See United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. 281 (1875); Westland Oil Co.
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 143 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir. 1944); Kearny v. Thomas,
225 N.C. 156, 33 S.E.2d 871 (1945); Richter v. Seawell, 183 Va. 379, 32 S.E.2d 62 (1944).
For a more theoretical explanation of the distinction between direct and inferential
proof, see Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269, 271 (1846) (Gibson, C.J.); 1 J. WIOMORF,
EVIDENCE §§ 25, 26, at 398-406 (3d ed. 1940).
99. Courts typically speak of judicial inference and statutory presumption as vir-
tually synonymous terms and apply the same tests in determining their validity in
criminal prosecutions. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); McAbee v.
United States, 434 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ripso, 338 F. Supp. 662
(E.D. Pa. 1972); People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17, 295 N.E.2d 753, 343 N.Y.S.2d
70, appeal dismissed, 94 S. Ct. 283 (1973).
100. The word "rational" is a term of art. In order for an inference to be found
"rational," the desired conclusion must be more likely than not to follow from the
proven facts as tested by common experience. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969). Generally courts will adduce evidence on their own motion, if necessary, to
determine whether a particular inference is true more likely than not.
The "more likely than not" standard may, however, be insufficient in this context.
Common law principles require that every element of a criminal offense must be
R roved beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776,
183-85 (D.D.C. 1968); C. MCCoRMItCK, EVIDENCE 674, 681-82 (1954); MODEL PENAL CODE,
§ 1.12 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962). If this standard were applied to inferences, it would
seem to indicate that the "more likely than not" standard is not stringent enough for
a criminal case. In Leary v. United States, supra, the Court left open the question of
which standard applies to inferences in criminal cases ("more likely than not" or
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facts. The presumed fact must more likely than not flow from the
facts proved, or it must be something which is obvious from com-
mon experience. 01
An inference that the money invested was derived from the proven
racketeering acts would meet this standard only if the government
could show that during the period in question the investor did not
have a sufficiently large income from legitimate sources to cover the
investment.102 In other words, it would be more likely than not that
the racketeer invested money derived from racketeering acts if it
could be shown that the racketeer did not have enough legitimate
income to insure that the investment could have been made with
altogether "clean" money. The problem with supporting such an
inference is that it is unlikely that the government would be suf-
ficiently informed about the investor's finances to establish how
much of his income was legitimate and how much came from un-
lawful sources.' 0 3 -,
Faced with such lack of knowledge, the government would have to
establish that some of the racketeer's supposedly legitimate income
(i.e., an amount large enough to prove that the racketeer did not have
sufficient "clean" money to cover the alleged investment) was not in
fact legitimate; the government would have to prove that it was
actually "laundered" income-the proceeds of an original investment
of dirty money.' 04 It is unlikely that the government could prove,
"beyond a reasonable doubt"). 395 U.S. at 36 n.64. See Barnes v. United States, 412
U.S. 837, 841-46 (1973); Turner v United States, 396 U.S. 398, 405 (1970). In Leary,
the Court added the words "substantial assurance" to the test of rationality. 395 U.S.
at 36. That is, the Court said that a presumption could not be applied in a criminal
prosecution unless it could be said, "with substantial assurance," that the presumed
fact was more likely than not to follow from the proven fact. This additional re-
quirement implies that the Court was not satisfied with the "more likely than not"
test. At least one court has opted for the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776 (D.D.C. 1968).
101. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463 (1943); McAbee v. United States, 434 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Ripso, 338 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Commonwealth v. Owens, 441 Pa. 318,
271 A.2d 518 (1970).
102. It is certainly far from clear that the mere fact that an investor possessed
some dirty money would support an inference that the dirty money was used for in-
vestment under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. It is at least as likely
that the investor used the dirty money for consumption and invested clean money.
Only if he did not have sufficient clean funds to cover the investment would the
inference satisfy the "more likely than not" standard.
103. It is likely that the financial records of a well-advised racketeer would at-
tribute all of his income to legitimate sources. See note 87 supra.
104. The government would have to show that the investment could not have been
made but for the use of some laundered money. Misreporting the actual source of
income would be a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1970), and thus, if the government
prior to the passage of § 1962(a) could prove that a racketeer had laundered dirty
money, it could prosecute the racketeer under income tax laws.
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directly or inferentially, that a particular sum of money was "laun-
dered." 1U5 Proof that some of a person's income was derived from
racketeering would not support an inference that it is more likely
than not that all or any part of the person's income was actually de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from racketeering. 100
Proving intent promises to be equally troublesome. The govern-
ment ordinarily establishes intent or knowledge in a criminal prose-
cution by requesting that the jury be permitted to infer intent or
knowledge from the circumstances surrounding the crime.'07 If the
105. See note 97 supra.
106. If the government could prove that a racketeer had $100 in income, had
probably derived Sl0 from racketeering, and had made a $30 investment (but could
not prove that the money invested was actually dirty), it would still not be rational to
infer that the investment was made with dirty money. It is not more likely than not
that the SI0 derived from racketeering was used in the $30 investment. There are
many things besides investment for which the $10 could have been used.
An inference designed to show that all of a racketeer's income was derived from
racketeering or that the legitimate sources of income were actually illegal, since an
original investment of dirty money had tainted all subsequent income, could take the
form of the community property mixing funds presumption. This presumption is a
device used to simplify proof in civil actions concerning tax matters and property
settlement questions. See W. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 236-66(3d ed. 1965). Before the mixing funds presumption could be used in a criminal prose-
cution, it would be necessary to determine whether it would meet the standard for
constitutional inferences.
The mixing funds presumption provides that if separate funds are commingled with
community funds, so that the separate funds cannot be traced, the commingled funds
are community property. See Rose v. Rose, 82 Idaho 395, 353 P.2d 1089 (1960); Munn
v. Munn, 63 Wash. 2d 349, 387 P.2d 547 (1963); see generally V. BURBY, supra, at 236-66.
If this presumption were applied to a racketeer, it would mean that unless he could
prove that he had disposed of all of the money that he had derived from racketeering
without mixing it with other funds (that is, that he had used all of the dirty money
for consumption needs), all of his money would be considered tainted.
This presumption is not rational. In terms of United States v. Leary, 395 U.S. 6(1969), the connection between the proved fact-that some dirty money was mixed
with clean money-and the presumption-that all of the money was therefore dirty-
is purely arbitrary. The presumption is permissible in civil cases for efficiency reasons;
a higher standard, however, is applied in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., North
American Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 243 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1957).
The mixing funds presumption might also place an unconstitutional burden of
proof on the defendant. It would require the defendant to prove that he had not
used any of the money derived from racketeering for investment, thus placing the
burden of tracing on him, rather than requiring the government to prove such a use.
The government could argue, without proof, that the defendant was guilty. In effect,
the defendant would have to prove he was innocent of the charge. See United States
v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 78-79 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting on other grounds); MODEL
PENAL CODE, § 1.13, Commentary (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), at 108-18.
In tax cases the government uses tracing rules like "first in, first out" to establish
that the taxpayer actually had more income than he claimed to have had. These rules
cannot establish anything more specific than the taxpayer's actual net worth; that is,
they cannot be used to reveal the specific sources of his income. See Duke, supra
note 10, at 8-34. Thus, tracing rules would not aid the government in a prosecution
under § 1962(a). The government would still have to prove that some money was
derived from racketeering.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Melton, Civil No. 72-1357 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 1973)
at 5-6; United States v. Floyd, 477 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Solomon,
422 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir.); cert. denied sub nora. Sommers v. United States, 399 U.S.
911 (1970). This way of establishing intent also raises the question of whether the
standard of proof is "more likely than not" or "beyond a reasonable doubt." See
note 100 supra.
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government were able to prove that the investor did not have suffi-
cient "legitimate" income to cover the investment or that the in-
vestor's seemingly "legitimate" income was actually "dirty," then it
might be rational, under the Tot-Learyl s requirements, for a court
to permit a jury to infer that the investor knew that the money was
dirty, hence establishing the investor's intent to invest dirty money.
However, without such proof, a jury could not permissibly infer
knowledge of investment of dirty money from the defendant's mere
possession of some dirty money, since it would be just as possible
that the racketeer believed the money he was investing was legitimate.
Further, even if the government could prove enough to permit the
inference of knowledge of the source of the money to go to the jury,
that would still not, by itself, establish intent to acquire control of
the business. Investment alone does not establish such intent. Hence,
inferring knowledge that funds invested were proceeds of racketeer-
ing activity merely from proof that the defendant committed two
prior racketeering acts, derived money from those acts, and at some
later time invested some money whose source could not be determined
would not be rational. 10 9
Thus it would appear that the government will be facing some of
the same kinds of proof problems under § 1962(a) that it faces gen-
erally in attempting to control organized crime."10 The fact that no
indictments have been brought under § 1962(a)"' and that, in con-
trast, indictments against organized crime generally have increased" 2
may indicate that the proof problems under § 1962(a) are especially
intractable. None of the present bills pending in Congress" 3 dealing
with the recodification and reform of Title 18 have addressed the
proof problems inherent in § 1962(a).
IV
If the language ambiguities of § 1962(a) were remedied, and if it
were made clear what the purpose of the statute is, hence clarifying
the mens rea problem, § 1962(a) would then at least be a compre-
hensible statute. However, such clarification would not address the
108. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
109. Such inference would be purely arbitrary. Only if some specific evidence was
introduced which tended to establish intent would the inference be permissible. See
pp. 1511-12 supra.
110. See sources cited in notes 4, 95 supra.
111. See note 19 supra.
112. Assistant Attorney General Petersen reported a sixty percent increase in indict-
ments of organized crime figures in 1972. See 10 BNA Cmr. L. REP. 2467 (1972).
113. See note 21 supra.
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major flaw of the statute: The statute adds virtually no new weapon
to secure convictions against racketeers. The elements of the offense
which are not amenable to direct proof cannot be proved by way of
inferences, because no constitutional inference could be designed.
Such a serious flaw must call the wisdom of the statute into question.
When Congress is called upon to adopt the revised Federal Crim-
inal Code, it should carefully scrutinize § 1962(a) and the approach
to the threat of organized crime it contains. Congress should recog-
nize that the problem of control of organized crime will not be solved
by the creation of esoteric new crimes and draconian punishments.
The problem with the enforcement of criminal laws against or-
ganized crime is and always has been a problem of evidence-gathering.
'It is to this problem that Congress should turn its attention.
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